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FORWARD
On April 13, 1976,President Gerald R. Ford signed into law
the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (16 USC 1801).
This Act represents a turning point in domestic fisheries management and will prove equally significant in its effect on international relations. The Act contains two major features. One
concerns the development of a domestic management n~gime. The
other deals with the unilateral assertion of a fishery conservation zone extending seaward to a distance of 200 nautical miles
from the baseline of the territorial seaft The passage of this
act will create significant social, economic, legal, and political
impacts throughout the fishing industry, the nation, and the world.
On Marr.h 1.8, 1976, several weeks before ~he signing of the
Act, a group of experts representing various levels of government,
fisheries management, economics, law, and science, convened for a
panel discussion of extended fisheries jurisdiction. This panel
discussion will undoubtedly be one of many such discussions seeking
to understand and deal with the far-reaching domestic and international implications of extended fisheries jurisdiction.
It is hoped that the publication of these presentations will
provide those interested in fisheries management with an understanding
of events leading to the enactment of the Fisheries Conservation and
Management Act of 1976 and an appreciation of its implications.
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SOME LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDED JURISDICTION
by
William Brewer
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Since my colleagues on the panel today are better qualified
than I am to discuss the international and economic implications of
extended jurisdiction, and to consider !ts effects on the states, I
would like to discuss with you some of the background of R.R. 200,
which will shortly be enacted by the Congress and w:lll in all likelihood be signed by the President. I would like to d:lscuss in very
broad terms some of its provisions, and finally mention a few of the
significant legal problems which I see arising out of the legal relationships which it creates.
Here, at the Virginia Institute of Marine Science, one does not
need to go over the history of the fisheries as a common resource,
nor the technical developments which have proliferated in the last
ten years and resulted in the catching capacity of the world's
fishing fleets exceeding the productive ability of most of the world's
fish resources. It has become common knowledge that practically all
of the marine species which are preferred by man are in greater or
lesser trouble from fishing pressure. It is also common knowledge that,
although the United States is a party to some 20 fishing treaties and
executive agreements, with many similar arrangements existing
between nations in other parts:of the world., the depletion of
our fish resources continues to accelerate. Many improvements have
been made in the treaties to which we are a party, the International
Convention on the North Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) being perhaps the
most advanced, but even there the pace of agreement lags behind the
problem.
Coastal nations themselves have been equally unsuccessful in
dealing with the problem of conservation of marine fisheries. The
1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing, which became ef f E~ctive in 1966,
permitted the coastal nation to take non-discriminatory action to
conserve fish stocks off its coasts. But it sufferE~d from two fatal
defects: first, the failure of the important fishing nations of Japan
and the Soviet Union to adhere to the treaty, and SE~cond, the requirement that such measures be non-discriminatory, in other words, that
foreign fishermen be treated on the same basis as fishermen of the
coastal nation. As a result, no nation has ever implemented this
provision of the treaty.
A new and separate mode of dealing with the problem started with
the Truman Proclamation of 1945, which asserted the ownership of the
United States over the living and non-living resources of the continental
shelf~ This principle was taken and expanded by the west coast
countries of South America by a unilateral claim to a 200-mile
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territorial sea. Although recognition of their claim was withheld
by the United States and most other countries, the trend was not to
be denied, and it has resulted in nea1;-agreement at the Law
of the Sea Conference on a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, as well
as the unilateral claim of 200-mile economic jurisdiction which is
found in the bill which will soon be enacted by the Congress of the
United States.
I think you are all aware that at present there is no general
domestic fisheries management legislation. A number of measures do
exist which deal with specialized areas. For example, our treaties
and Executive agreements have generally been followed by implementing·
legislation. Examples of this are the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
Act of 1950, implementing ICNAF, and the Tuna Conventions Act of 1950,
which implements the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention. Species
which are endangered, and those which have captured our collective
imaginations, receive special protection in the Endangered Species Act
of 1973 and the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972. Foreign
fishing has been prohibited, .although not managed, in the three-mile
territorial sea and in the exclusive fisheries zone extending nine
miles beyond the territorial sea. The Bartlett Act, in addition to
prohibiting Bu.ch foreign fishing, makes i t equally unlawful to take

the living resources of the continental shelf, to which claim is laid
by the Truman Proclamation, later enforced by the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf. Management authority, and indeed ownership,
of the resources within three miles, which were originally claimed
for the United States by the Supreme Court in 1947, have been given
back to the states by the Submerged Lands Act of 1953.
An attempt at general fisheries management legislation was made
in 1973 when Representative Dingell introduced a bill known- as the
High Seas Fisheries Conservation Act. This was of course applicable
only to foreign fishermen in the nine-mile contiguous zone, but it
was intended to lay the groundwork for future extension of jurisdiction.
It failed because of a feeling on the part of the industry that
American fishermen would be regulated beyond nine miles while foreign
fishermen would not. A similar management measure was introduced by
Senator Magnuson and others in the Senate in 1974, but this time it
was coupled with the unilaterial assertion of 200-mile jurisdiction,
and the bill was enacted by the Senate. It attracted strong
Administration opposition because of the feared consequence to our
negotiating position at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea, which was then, and is now, in progress. These efforts were
successful in preventing the bill from reaching the House of Representatives
and it died with the end of the 93rd Congress. However, the strategy
of combining 200-mile jurisdiction, which was desired by most if not all
fishermen, with a management bill, which was generally disliked
although grudgingly admitted to be necessary at some point, proved to
be successful. There was little opposition to the combined bill from
fishing industry sources.
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In the 94th Congress starting in 1975 there was a tidal wave of
support for 200-mile legislation. H.R. 200, introduced by Representative
Studds of Massachusetts and co-sponsored by many other Representatives,
passed in October by a vote of 208 to 101. The simi.lar S. 961,
introduced by Senator Magnuson of Washington and eighteen other Senators,
passed in January of 1976 by a vote of 77 to 19. After the Congressional
recess in early February, a committee of conference was appointed, and
went promptly to work. Most of the major issues were settled by the
conferees at two meetings on February 24th and 26th. A combined staff
of half a dozen attorneys then began regular meetings to generate a
conference text and to settle between them numerous other discrepancies
and problems. At this point, the advice of the Exec.utive agencies
was solicited and was freely provided. I think it i.s fair to say that
the advice of these agencies, and I can speak partic.ularly for our own,
has been helpful in foreseeing and eliminating many future problems, and
there has been an excellent relationship between the: staffs and the
agencies in dealing with these problems. By and large, the technical
advice of the agencies has been accepted except in c.ases where it conflicts with the clear political decision of the conferees. This is of
course the way the conference committee should work. What may be the
last meeting of the conferees was scheduled to take place on Wednesday,
March 17th~
In this Congress the Administration's position on the bill changed
quite markedly. If the Congress would delay impleme:ntation of the
200-mile provision until 1977, thus giving the LOS Conference a chance
to reach agreement this year, ~he President would si.gn. This was
agreed, and the bill now bears an effective date of March 1, 1977.
Relatively little interest was taken by the Administration in the management provisions. However, Department of State, the Coast quard in the
Department of Transporation, and of course NOAA in the Department of
Commerce, took a very lively interest, and I think we all contributed,
as mentioned above, to the eventual shape of the bill. Each of these
three agencies will be given important new responsibilities: State in
negotiating and re-negotiating fisheries agreements, Coast Guard in

enforcing the regulations in an area of ocean two-thirds as large as
the United States, and Commerce in its general role as the fisheries
management agency.
The bill as it emerged is really two measures i.n one: the assertion
of a 200-mile exclusive fisheries zone, with provisi.on for foreign
fishing under certain prescribed circumstances, and a comprehensive
fisheries management plan. Since I expect that one or more of my
colleagues will discuss its international implicati.ons I would like to
spend most of my time on the domestic aspects of the: measure.
A fisheries conservation zone is created which extends 197 nautical
miles beyond the boundary of the Territorial Sea. State regulation of
fisheries within the three-mile zone, conferred upon the states by the
Submerged Lands Act, is preserved, subject to certai.n preemption requirements which I will discuss further.
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If a foreign nation desires to secure rights for its fishing
vessels to fish within the fisheries conservation zone, it may negotiate a master agreement, which essentially acknowledges the jurisdiction of the United States over the zone, and makes provision for
the issuance of permits to individual vessels. Once admitted,
foreign fishing vessels will be subject to the same regulations as
domestic vessels, except that the license fee payable by foreign
vessels will differ and will be in most cases larger.
Certain species of fish receive special treatment under the Act.
Anadromous species, primarily salmon, remain under U.S. management
and ownership even when outside the U.S. fisheries zone. Whether this
is consistent with existing international law remains to be determined.
Highly migratory species, primarily tuna, are completely exempt from
U.S. management authority in order to be regulated by virtue of international agreement. One exception to this statement is that existing
state regulation of the tuna fishery conducted by the citizens of a
particular state will conti.nue to be permitted. Finally, the continental
shelf fisheries, primarily lobster and c~(ab, remain within the U.S.
management authority even if 'they are located beyond the 200-mile
zone. In fact the continental shelf does extend beyond 200 miles in a
few places, primarily Alaska.
Apparently because of a feeling that the Administration would be
likely to trade away fishing privileges for other national interests,
the conferees were determined to retain a degree of Congressional oversight of international fishery agreements. Such agreements must be
tabled for sixty days before becoming effective so as to allow Congressional action if desired. After toying with the idea of permitting
implementation to be blocked by the action of a single House, wiser
heads pointed out the constitutional difficulties involved,. and it was
settled that Congress must act by a bill or joint resolution if an agreement were to be terminated. The provision for tabling the agreement and
for congressional action applies only to Executive agreements, since it
was felt that the advice and consent procedure would be sufficient checkand-balance with respect to fishing conventions.
In designing the management procedure itself, Congress, as well as
the conferees, sought to achieve a system of checks and balances between
federal and state power. While we are speaking primarily of fisheries
in federal waters, it should be recalled that there is a long tradition
of fisheries regulation by the states, primarily the western states,
and very little if any tradition in the f'ederal government. Note also
the general shifting of the center of power toward state governments
that seems to exist in 1976. As a result the bill may be somewhat
more heavily weighted toward state authority than would have been the
case, say, ten years ago. However, I believe the final program worked
out is feasible, and aside from being somewhat cumbersome, does effectively represent the various interests involved.
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Management plans for the various species will be prepared by
Regional Fisheries Management Councils, of which eight have been
created. They recognize the regional character of the fisheries.
Councils will represent the New England, Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic,
Caribbean, Gulf, Pacific, North Pacific, and Western Pacific regions.
They vary in size, but the general pattern is that each state in the
region will have its principal fisheries executive on the Council,
together with at least one other member. The regional director of
the National Marine Fisheries Service will also be a voting member.
The Fish and Wildlife Service, Coast Guard, and the State Department
will have non-voting representatives, and the executive director of
the Marine Fisheries Commission will also be a non-voting member.
Staff and support will be provided by the Department of Commerce.
When a management plan has been prepared, the Secretary of
Commerce is charged with developing regulations under the plan. Both.
the plan and the regulations must be consistent with certain national
fisheries regulations standards which are listed in the Act and are
very general in nature. The ·Secretary has certain specified powers
with respect to emergency plans and regulations, with respect to the
plans which are not consistent with the national standards, and in
cases where the council or councils cannot agree on a management plane
If the stock of fish which is concerned is found in part within
state waters, 'federal regulation can preempt state regulation under
certain clearly defined circumstances where the state regulation is
found to be inconsistent with ;he federal plan.
There are very broad penalty and enforcement provisions in the
Act. Both civil and criminal penalties are provided for. .In addition,
there is an automatic forfeiture of catch in cases of viola.tion. ·
Forfeiture of both gear and vessel is permitted by normal judicial
forfeiture proceedings. The institution of enforcement proceedings
is a responsibility of NOAA, while the Justice Department will, as
usual,.handle the proceedings once the litigation stage is reached.

At sea, the primary responsibility for enforcement is in the hands
of the Coast Guard, requiring the extended use of VE!ssels and airplanes.
Like NOAA, the Coast Guard has been at work for a pE!riod of at least
two years attempting to anticipate the problems of Extended Jurisdiction
and to plan for their additional equipment needs. It is obviously
impossible to patrol every square mile of this larg,~ territory, so
plans have been made to patrol selected fishing areas on a seasonal
basis, thus getting maximum use from personnel and ,~quipment. Even with
this limitation, the Coast Guard has requested additional ships and
airplanes for the task. Basically this means addit:Lonal high-endurance
cutters, and additional C-130 long-range aircraft. NOAA personnel
will normally be on board the ships and aircraft engaged in enforcement
work, as they are now in connection with enforcement under the various
fisheries conventions.
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Certain other fisheries acts have been repealed or amended to
conform to H.R. 200. The Bartlett Act and the Contiguous Fisheries
Zone Act have been repealed; the Marine Mammal Protection Act has
been amended to extend its coverage to the 200-mile zone. The
indemnity provisions for U.S. vessels under the Fishermens'Protective
Act have been amended to provide that they will continue to be
available under certain circumstances even though the United States
may recognize the 200-mile jurisdiction claims of the foreign
country involved.
This has been, of course, a very brief treatment of a long and
complicated piece of legislation. It should already be apparent to
you that there will be numerous, troublesome, legal problems arising
under it. Perhaps we have averted some of them by careful attention
to the Act during drafting and in conference. Let me suggest to you a
few of the problems which I see arising, without venturing answers
at this point.
On the international. scene, the Act provides for a determination
of the excess stock available for foreign fishermen. Despite careful
drafting, I foresee difficulties and possibly litigation on the amount
of this excess. The question of negotiation with adjacent States,
primarily Canada, is difficult to fit within the framework of the
statute, since fisheries which are shared are frequently managed under
the provisions of special international agreements, sometimes by
international commissions, and the determination of foreign fishing
rights will .equally have to be accomplished jointly. At present there
exist slightly more than 20 fisheries treaties and agreements to which
the U.S. is a party. The process of adjusting these as they expire
or come up for renewal to the provisions of the Act is bound to be
complicated and difficult. Finally, I have mentioned the difficulties
which we may encounter under international law in asserting ownership
and management of an anadromous species beyond the 200-mile zone.
On the domestic front, other problems ar~ visible on the horizon.
The relationship of the Secretary of Commerce to the Regional councils,
especially in situations where disagreement arises as to the content
of a management plan, has been the subject of scrutiny by the conferees
and their staffs and by ourselves, but I doubt if every problem has
been worked out. Since management plans and management regulations are
treated somewhat differently under the Act, there may be valid differences
of opinion as to which is which, and again these may be exacerbated by
different views on the part of the Secretary and the councils. Limited
entry programs are authorized under the bill, with the consent of a
majority of the Council, but are certain to be opposed by fishing
interests who desire to enter the fishery and are excluded in whole or
in part. The question of preemption of state rights, even though
spelled out carefully in the Act, might lead to litigation where state/
federal views were markedly divergent. Finally, it is more than likely
that the resources of money and people to enforce the Act on a fully
adequate basis will be lacking, if for no other reason than because a

6

full-scale enforcement effort designed to cover all contigencies
would probably cost more than any possible economic benefit. In this
case, there will be uneven enforcement, and suits to require enforcement or to avoid enforcement on the basis of inequity can be anticipated.
I hope I am not taking too gloomy a view in this list of legal
problems, but experience suggests that any new and ce>mplicated Act,
reaching into new fields and affecting interests and people who have
never been regulated before, is bound to generate controversy and litigation. Despite all this, those of us who are involved are moved by
the sense of great adventure which I have alluded to in the title, the
adventure of attempting to save a great national resource which would
otherwise disappear, perhaps forever, and the hope of making it
available on a self-sustaining basis to the United States and to some
extent, to all of mankind.
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MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDED FISHERIES JURISDICTION

by
Dr. Jackson Davis
Virginia Institute of Marine Science
For the first time in the approximately 370 years of European
settlement of North America the United Sta.tes is attempting to address
our fisheries problems in a concerted and organized fashion. This,
despite the fact that fisheries were one of the features which originally attracted European colonists to this continent. St. John's
Newfoundland, for example, has been continuously occupied by people
of European origin since the'late 1500's and that occupation has been
based on fisheries. We are now approaching a new r«~gime with all of
its attendant problems and opportunities. Fisheries in the United
States are at the dawn of a new era.
In considering the implications of extended jurisdiction, we
might start by asking why the Congress is contemplating extending
jurisdiction at all? One of the reasons is, perhaps, that several
of our neighbors to the south have done so and we f:Lnd ourselves out
of style in the hemisphere. There are more cogent reasons than style,
however. Many of these reasons occurred to our neighbors to the south
sooner than they did to us, apparently. Most important among them, I
think, is the fact that the present system, or lack of a system, has been
unsatisfactory. The various international arrangements that bear on
fishing problems have, in general, not satisfactorily addressed problems
until they reached or passed the crisis stage. The International Whaling
Commission is perhaps a good example; ICNAF is another.

Both of these

Commissions are now, I think, making very significant progress. However,
neither was able to do so until a number of stocks were severely overexploited. Looking at the ICNAF situation, we see overfishing, largely
by foreign distant water fleets, of haddock, herring, mackerel, and some
other stocks. The domestic management has not really been any better and
in some cases not so good as some of the international attempts at management. For example, turning again to the ICNAF area we see that yellowtail flounder stocks are overfished. This has been largely a domestic
offense rather than a foreign one.
A difficulty with operating under current international law and
custom and through various multilateral and bilateral agreements, is
that these involve a certain "buying and selling"; a series of tradeoffs. The reason for this is that the interests of the participating
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groups are rather diverse and there is no mechanism to force accommodation. Fishing strategies of the various countries differ, as do national
and social goals and economic systems. The distant water fleets fishing
off of our coast are concerned, of course, solely with food. They are,
in the view of some of our people, interfering with recreational fisheries
of considerable value both socially and economically to coastal residents
of the U.S. It becomes very difficult to reconcile these differing
social goals in a system in which each participant in the game has equal
rights. No one is in a position to decide a disagreement other than by
bartering or trading goods or concessions. So this is the difficulty
in which we find ourselves. The fact is that attempts must be made to
accommodate the increasing protein needs of the world population and the
differing national and social needs to the potential yield of the fish
stocks of the oceans. These have not been accommodated in the existing
scheme. Therefore we are seeking something better.
To further visualize national di~ferences in points of view consider, as an example, the situation of the Soviet Union, Poland or the
GDR fishing on the continental shelf adjacent to the East Coast. They
fish for mackerel and sea herring primarily, two species which have not
been of great interest to the U.S. fisheries. In the course of their
directed fishery on mackerel and sea herring the fishing vessels of these
countries have incidentally, almost accidentally in some cases, made
serious inroads into stocks that are of considerable interest to or
that are the basis of economic life of some of our coastal fishermen
and, in some cases, entire communities. These stocks, which are not
very large, are looked upon by the large distant water fleets as being
nusiance fish in their operations. They would prefer clean catches of
only one or two species. The Soviets and the Poles must think we of the
U.S. are the craziest people in the world to devote so much attention to
a stock of fish capable of producing perhaps 20,000 tons a year. They
are interested in stocks from which they can expect to take 100 to 200
thousand tons a year. These small stocks which are so important to
the U. S. fishermen seem trivial to them.
The fishing strategies of coastal fleets and distant water fleets
differ. The distant water fleets have, of necessity, a logistic system
which allows them high mobility. They can go from place to place. They
are not dependent upon maintaining in a viable condition a fish stock
occuring in a particular geographic site. The Soviet Union in particular
has adopted the strategy of "pulse fishing" in which they concentrate
their efforts on one fish stock which is abundant at a particular place
and time. They fish it down to the point that the catch no longer repays
the harvesting costs and they then switch to another species and fish
that one down. The biological theory behind pulse fishing (if there
is any) is that if there are several species to run through, by the time
the last is fished out, the first one will have recovered and will again
support a fishery. Regretably this has not yet happened in .the case-of
haddock which the Soviets overfished in 1965. Pulse fishing is not
compatible with coastal fisheries which operate from the same ports trip
after trip and year after year. As an example, if one of these highly
mobile distant water fleets were to destroy (as they practically have)
the stock of scup that the Hampton Roads trawl fishery has historically
10

operated on it would be of no great import to the distant water fleet;
it could move on to another stock in another area. The domestic fleet,
which is tied to a particular port of operation, could not move; it has
nowhere else to go.
In order to reach solutions to such problems, the party which feels
that its ox is being gored must be able to provide something of value
to win concessions. The distant water fishermen are not violating any
law, although they are economically damaging nearshore participants in
the fishery. So, when the United States attempted, through bilateral
agreements to alleviate some of its fishery problems we had to give
something in return. The amount of suitable trading material is
limited. If there are more problems than there are trading materials,
when your pockets become empty, you are still left with a number of
social problems and a number of fish stocks which are not producing
at the level that would be most economical. Additionally some nations
seemingly expected the U. S. to pay them to fish rationally. Thus
the regime of freedom of the seas was not satisfactory. Under it
coastal fisheries were being severely disrupted and several stocks
were being overfished. Therefore, the U. S. is establishing a more
effective regime. Undoubtedly the new regime will not solve all of
the international and domestic fisheries problems. It will, however,
make significant progress.
Foremost among the problems and implications of the new fisheries
regime will be allocation of the limited resources among the many who
wish to harvest them. This issue, how to "slice the pie", will be
contentious both domestically and internationally. We can expect contention domestically over the question of whether or not there is a
surplus of a stock which can be allocated to foreigners. This will
be a critical problem. We can presume that there will be a tendency
on the part of the United States industry to hold stocks to itself
because the more dense a fish stock is, the cheaper it is to fish. The
U. S. will be inclined to build up what will appear to the foreigners
to be a large surplus. The foreigners, of course, will be placing
pressure on us to make the largest possible quantity available for
harvest.
Once we determine domestically that surplus in some stock is
available off our coast, how will the United States, through the State
Department, allocate this to foreigners? Will we take the altruistic
point of view that in a world suffering from protein. starvation, our
surplus stock should be made available only to those; countries that
have a severe protein malnutrition problem? Will we., on the other hand,
merely put it up on the auction block? Will we involve fisheries in
various other trade-offs, connnercial and political? Will access to
fish be traded for so many cubic feet of natural gas or for access to
certain military bases or for various other necessary inter-governmental arrangements?
A fisheries zone of 200 miles will necessitate negotiation of
borders, not only with Canada and Mexico, with whom we share land
borders, but also with a few other nations. Wherever a 200-mile zone
11

would impinge on the fisheries zone or other territory of another
nation, a boundary must be negotiated. This aspect will involve
dealing with Cuba and the USSR among others. This issue may become
clouded by considerations other than fisheries. For example, petroleum
and hard minerals may become involved. With regard to international
allocation there are several problems that will be exciting and contentious to address.
As difficult as international allocation is going to be, I think
domestic allocation will be even more problematic. We have chosen
as our fisheries management goal optimum yield. Neither of the
alternative goals, maximum sustainable yield or maximum economic
yield, was politically viable. It was politically feasible to settle
on optimum yield because the concept is so vaguely defined that each
person contemplating it could interpret it as being favorable to
his interests. It will be impossible to satisfy all interested parties.
It will even be extremely difficult to have the various users of the
resources equally dissatisfied, but perhaps that is the best that we
can hope for.
·
By selecting optimum yield as our goal we have postponed making

some difficult decisions. As we design and adopt management plans
for the various fisheries we will find it necessary to more accurately
define optimum yield in terms of allocations among user groups. Predictably, the fur will fly. In this question of allocation in fisheries
management under the optimum yield goal the role of science will be
smaller than it has normally been in fisheries. I refer primarily to
international fisheries management in which the goal has been generally
agreed upon to be maximum production of food. The goal has been relatively
simple without involvement of a number of confusing social issues, and
the strategy has been largely aimed at maximum sustainable yield of
protein. With such differing economic schemes in different countries
economic management has been little involved. I think that there will
be a lessened role of classical fishery science in management. This,
however, should not be looked upon as an undesirable development. The
role will be reduced only relatively. Neither socio-economic factors
nor political factors have played a large enough role in fisheries
management to date and this has been one of the serious problems. The
decisions to be made are indeed political in the best sense of the
word. They are social decisions and therefore they must be made at
the political level. There is no standard by which goals can be determined to be good or bad. A fishery can be managed for maximum sustainable yield. It can be managed to provide the maximum number of jobs.
Similarly it can be managed in order that the participants reap a
maximum profit. Conversely it can be managed so that maximum freedom
of access is maintained. No one of these goals is inherently superior
to the others politically, socially, or scientifically. Selecting from
among the spectrum of goals requires, in my view, social decisions of the
sort that should be made by political bodies. This is one of the things
that disturbs me about the extended jurisdiction fisheries legislation
now pending in the Congress. The hybrid bill that has emerged from
H.R. 200 and S. 961 does not, in my view, set up a politically viable
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mechanism for making some of the hard political decisions that must
be made. I do not believe that the management counc:Lls which would
be established have a broad enough social base to be capable, politically, of making these decisions.
Similarly there are social decisions to be made regarding limiting
entry. Fisheries management never regulates what the fish do, it
always regulates what the people do. Therefore the decisions are
social and political. The number of participants who are harvesting
a connnon property resource can be limited. This has been rarely
done up to this point in time but it is indeed possible to limit
entry. As the number of participants is adjusted upward or downward
the money made by the participants will increase or decrease. Society
thus has the opportunity to manipulate the earnings of the participants
in a fishery in an attempt to provide for a reasonable rate of return
on capital invested and reasonable compensation for the workers.
A new era in fisheries is upon us as a result of either or both of
two actions now pending. The 'UN Law of the Sea ConfE~rence now in progress
in New York is seeking a rational international regime. I doubt that
agreement will be immediately forthcoming from this forum .. It now
appears that the pending Fisheries Management and Conservation Act will
pass Congress and be signed into law by the President. Therefore, the
domestic management procedure and international allocation problems
will be with us and they will require thoughtful, patient people to
work out solutions.
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A STATE'S VIEW OF EXTENDED JURISDICTION
by
James E. Douglas, Jr.
Virginia Marine Resources Commission
Introduction
At the outset let me refer you to the title of this presentation
and pointedly note that my remarks here today, both in the prepared
text and any extemporaneous comments later, must be viewed in the
light of my experience as Virginia's chief fisheries officer. My
colleagues in other states might not share my views; and even if
they did, I am sure their emphasis, priorities, and conclusions
drawn are quite likely to differ from mine. In addition, let me note
that there are many aspects of extended jurisdiction and, time being
limited, I have chosen only those aspects that I consider most salient.
There is evidence of strong agreement among at least the East
Coast states with regard to the principle of extended jurisdiction.
In 1974 the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission, consisting
of 15 East Coast states from Maine to Florida, adopted a resolution
calling for the passage of a bill that would extend the fisheries
jurisdiction of the United States to 200 miles. Whil,e this .resolution
dealt with only one method of extending jurisdiction, namely unilateral
Congressional action, I feel confident in using it as an indication of
the collective wishes of those states for extended jurisdiction. In
fact, the only state to demur in that resolution explained that they
were in favor of the concept but disagreed with the v,ehicle.

We could

indeed spend considerable time discussing the merits ,of the various
ways of achieving extended jurisdiction, but in the interest of time I
shall not attempt such here. It will, however, be necessary to note
that two different approaches are in progress at the moment.
First, however, consider the current legal and jurisdictional
regime, wherein the United States adheres to a three-mile territorial
sea. In short, the legal boundary of the United Stat,es extends three
miles seaward; and this three-mile belt is considered also as the
boundaries of the several coastal states. Thus Virginia's East Coast
boundary, and of course jurisdiction, extend three miles seaward. In
1966 the Congress, via P.L. 89-658, added nine miles to the Territorial
Sea, called it the Contiguous Fisheries Zone, and declared unilateral
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United States management of fisheries within that zone. One must note
that the coastal states do not share in any authorities in the Contiguous
Fisheries Zone.
What is Extended Jurisdiction?
As mentioned, there are two approaches currently in progress.
Each would extend fisheries management jurisdiction to 200 miles,
but each takes a different tack through a different forum.
Unilateral extension is that term used to describe the
Congressional action that has resulted in passage by both the Senate
and House of separate bills that would create a new Contiguous
Fisheries Zone to extend 197·miles seaward of the Territorial Sea.
Add three to that and you get 200. These bills are very near their
final massaging by the conference committee which is ironing out
differences between the two versions. In fact, today's newspaper
indicates agreement has been reached.
The second approach is much more complex in that a 200-mile
Economic Zone, which would include fisheries management, is proposed
by the United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea (LOS) to be the
standing international law. While there is general agreement among
the 150 nations at that conference that fisheries management should
extend to 200 miles, the conference is similarly dealing with so many
other matters of intense concern that a comprehensive treaty may, indeed,
be hard to come by.
The problem, as seen by the states.
In a word the problem was foreign fishing effort. Large fleets
of efficient distant water vessels, led mainly by the Soviets, came
to the northwest Atlantic off the shores of Canada and the United States,
and with the highly predatory practice of "pulse fishing" on those
historic high-yield areas, such as the Grand Banks of Newfoundland and
George's Bank, soon began to deplete the stocks measurably. The United
States first heard the cry from the New England fishermen, but as
stocks became depleted in the Northwest the distant water fleets moved
to the South. Evidence exists, and it was presented to the Congress,
that Virginia's total landings, and landings per vessel, began to decline
immediately after the foreign fishing effort moved into Virginia's offshore waters. An even more dramatic example is the correlation between
the increased catch of river herring by foreign fishing vessels and
the decreased catch of that same species within the Chesapeake Bay.
But recognizing the threat presented by such unrestrained and
irresponsible fishing was one thing; what to do about it was another!
The United States t"isherman found himself in a dilemma; he is quite
independent and is opposed to governmental regulation; but without
governmental help, the foreign fishermen would ruin the stocks upon
which the domestic fisherman depends. Faced with the choices of certain
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biological depletion and economic destruction or governmental jurisdiction over these stocks, he and the states wisely chose the only
hope available, Extended Jurisdiction.
Although there is at present no extended jurisdiction of federal
authority, the United States is not without certain ve~hicles that
address the problem of foreign overfishing and conservation. These
vehicles take the form of international agreements. Regrettably the
success or failure of such agreements is directly proportional to
the foreign nation's acceptance and understanding of the scientific
data, and the degree of responsibility and willingness of the foreign
nation to adhere to the terms of the agreement. Such agreements may
be multi-lateral such as the eighteen-nation International Commission
for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF), or as bi-lateral agreements between the United States and one other nation. Several bi-lateral agreements are in existence, the most notable examples being those
with the Soviet Union and Poland. My personal experiemce with ICNAF,
and with some of the bi-laterals, is that we have made~ significant
strides in gaining agreement and acceptance of scientific data, but
little progress has been made in the field of responsible attitudes.
Perhaps this is a kudos to the scientists who say, above all, they
are objective. At any rate I am certain that my observation is indeed
an indictment of the bureaucrats and political leadership in the fisheries
ministries of these foreign nations.
If one finds no federal authority beyond 12 miles, other than
that accorded by international agreement, then it come~s as no surprise
when I say there is no state jurisdiction either. But that is not
altogether true. There are certain devices available to states such
as landing laws and the limited control a state has over its residents
beyond the Territoral Sea. Landing laws are the best present approach.
Examples would include prescriptions on allowable sizE~s, total catch,
and seasons. Any truly effective state-oriented scheme almost always
involves the necessity for uniform laws or regulations among the several
states, and this has been extremely difficult to achieve.

The bottom

line of any state regulation is that it can deal only with the actions
of United States fishermen and cannot hope to approach a solution to the
real problem of regulation of foreign fishing effort.
Thus I must conclude that none of the present approaches are
capable of solving the probl~m. Mind you there is no inherent reason
why international agreements could not be a solution, but a dramatic
change in attitude would be required; and I do not seE~ that as
happening--at least I am unwilling to take that chanc,~ if there are
better approaches available. Clearly the states, singularly or
collectively, are unable to present any solution.
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Extended Jurisdiction as the solution.
It must seem obvious to all of you by now that Extended
Jurisdiction is designed to give us precisely what is missing--a
legal regime that will cover most of the stocks important to United
States domestic fisheries. I have no intention at this point to
discuss the legal, ethical, or moral propriety of unilateral extension
versus LOS extension. Indeed, I believe the difference between these
two approaches is basically philosophical yet tempered with very real
concerns over the most appropriate method and its impact on other United
States' policies, and the policies of the other nation's toward the
United States. At any rate I'll leave that subject for your noble
minds to wrestle with in some of your informal discussions. When
you all agree on the solution, I'm sure the Secretary of State would
be interested in hearing from you.
Lets first examine unilateral extension and its considerable
state involvment. The current bill, if it emerges as I truly believe
it will, will establish a unique state/federal partnership. States
harbor a considerable amount of data and expertise in fisheries
management, not the least of which is in evidence right here at the
Virginia Institute of Marine Science. Collectively the states have
more expertise than the federal government; and so it is not without
reason that the bill will establish several Regional Councils on which
state representatives will have voting power. I was informed yesterday
that the National Marine Fisheries Service Regional Director may also
have a vote in the final version of the bill. While the make-up of
these Councils will vary, the Middle Atlantic Regional Council, which
will include Virginia, will be composed of nineteen voting members,
of whom eighteen will be state representatives and one a federal
representative. Management programs developed by majority ·vote of the
Regional Council will be reviewed by the Secretary of Commerce who may
exercise a right to veto. But provision is made to override the veto
by a two-thirds vote. I'll hazard a guess that any management plan
agreed to by less than two-thirds of a Council is a poor plan per se,
and might well deserve a veto. At any rate, the key point here is the
clear-cut authority given to the states through the Regional Councils
to develop fisheries management plans in the newly expanded Contiguous
Fisheries Zone.
Management plans having cleared this quasi-legislative route will
then be translated into regulations and will run through the normal
administrative procedures for federal rule making, and will thus become
in effect federal law. Primary enforcement responsibility will fall
to the Coast Guard, although there is talk of deputizing state law
enforcement officials to assist.
But lets not lose sight of the problem--foreign fishing effort.
It is not quite clear to me at this time how Regional Councils will
approach this. There is general, but far from unanimous, agreement that
the doctrines of "optimum utilization" and "coastal state's preference"
will be the controlling doctrines ("state" as used here is synonomous
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with nation). The United States would determine the total allowable
catch of a species, assign to its domestic fishermen whatever portion
of the total allowable catch they can take and use (it might be all),
then assign the remainder to foreign users. In any event, whatever
doctrine emerges, it is clear to me that it must serve to reduce
foreign fishing effort and restore the depleted stocks to, at, or
near a maximum sustainable yield level.
Several other key questions arise and serve to obfuscate the
states' role in unilateral extension of jurisdiction. I have already
mentioned the voting procedure, whereby it would be possible for
several states to gang up on one or two states to pass a managment
scheme that would regulate a species indigenous primarily to the
minority states.
There is also a statement regarding the right of the Secretary
of Commerce to prepare federal management plans when the states do
not do so on a timely basis. This increasingly familiar caveat in
federal law is particularly offensive to me in that for all practical
purposes it serves to void any authorities granted to the states.
Succinctly it says, "I will allow you to do it, so long as I am in
agreement with the way you do it." Perhaps in the subject legislation,
we have a better than usual system of checks and balances; and besides,
my experience with fisheries management personnel in. other states and
at the federal level has been most cordial and most agreeable.
Embodied in the language -is a strong hint that the Councils, or
the federal government through its pre-emption provisions, will be
able to regulate fisheries within the Territorial Sea, an area heretofore considered soley the state's domain. A state's interior waters,
such as the Chesapeake Bay, will not be pre-empted so I am told.
Whether this federal pre-emption in territorial wate:rs is new via this
bill, or has always been in existence, might be answered in a present
case before the United States Supreme Court, styled James E. Douglas, Jr.,
Commissioner v. Seacoast Products, Inc. et al. You might wish to
follow the Court's ruling should the case be accepted.
Another problem to be faced is how to handle the interim between
the effective date of extended jurisdiction and the promulgation of
management regulations for a given species or stock. Clearly no one
expects the Councils to perform instantaneous manageiment of all species.
Already some thoughts are in progress to have ICNAF address this problem.
But what if the second alternative of international agreement via
the Conference on Law of the Sea should become a reality? I am of the
opinion that such a happening will change little, H any, of what I
have previously discussed. First, the unilateral extension bills provide that it shall be the law until the United StatE!S ratifies any
Law of the Sea Treaty that deals with exte.nded fisht~ries management.
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In modern day parlace, the law will self-destruct in favor of an LOS
agreement. Secondly, and here I am subject to correction by counsel,
I am of the opinion that the effect of an LOS treaty will be agreement by the nations that each coastal nation has a 200-mile zone for
fisheries management and the right to regulate within that zone. It
seems a simple parliamentary matter to transfer the same institutional
arrangements from domestic regulation gained through unilateral extension to domestic regulation gained through LOS. But, this problem
may be academic, for the President has indicated he wishes to delay
the effective date of unilateral extension until after the present
session of the LOS conference just begun this week. Thus an LOS
solution might pre-empt any unilateral action.
Conclusions
Most domestic fishermen want unilateral extension. Most states
have supported unilateral extension. I believe the reasons for this
position are many-fold; but primary are 1) we understand domestic law
better than international law, 2) we trust domestic law more than
international agreements, 3) we feel domestic law is more adaptable
and more quickly adjusted than international law or international
agreements, and 4) domestic law is more likely in fact to occur than
is a LOS treaty.
Under present unilateral extension bills, states will have the
primary role in developing fisheries management plans; however there
are prescribed checks and balances against both the states and the
federal establishment.
Finally, and foremost, a legal regime will exist that will afford
an opportunity to manage and conserve fish stocks adjacent to our
nation's shores.
With so much of the world being dependent upon the oceans and
seas as a source for much needed protein, it is an opportunity that
we must not fail to grasp, and it is a situation for which we must
not fail to find a solution.
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INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDED JURISDICTION
by
Dr. Daniel Lecuona
The World Bank
One addition I would make to Professor Theberge's words of introduction is that I am currently serving in the World Bank, an international institution which is probably best characterized as a financial
arm of the United Nations system. This institution represents 130 nations,
and its staff is made up of people from 80 different countries. So, in
confronting the problem of freedom of speech, we arrived at a compromise:
Whenever we speak, we have to'alert you that we speak neither for 80
countries nor for 130 nations. In fact, I speak for nobody except for
myself. As a result of which you may wonder what I am doing here I
will try to provide some reasons for that. Having been preceded by three
very scholarly discussions from distinguished Americans, I might discuss
concepts that sound somewhat shocking or heretical. Perhaps the purpose
of my presence here is to present the international aspects of today's
topic from the perspective of an outsider who has seen many issues debated
and defended from more than one. side and who as an -international civil
servant, thi'nks it is his duty to try to reconcile· those many sides into
some connnon understanding.
Now I myself happen to be a
Not that I had any problems with
something else. As a former law
of you here may never hear about

lawyer who no longer practices law.
the bar; I'm just having more fun doing
student, it comes to my mind that some
fisheries again and it is just as well;

but others who will, whether as lawyers, or as offici.als of government

agencies, or as representatives of fishing interests, will have to take
sides and will have to make choices. In that process, any dedicated
individual tends to identify with his own side much to the detriment of
his perception of what is on the other side. Having served now for a
number of years in an international institution has e.xposed me to that
kind of situation and has given me the privileged opportunity to look
at both sides all the time.
Any attemptat reconciling conflicting views has to begin with a
realistic appreciation of the differences between the: parties. In the
matter at hand today, one of the greatest problems is that of reconciling
what I would call almost isolated legal systems. The: United States
operates on what is known basically as the common la~, system which, though
it may surprise you, puts your country in the minority of the world.
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Most other nations,including the Soviet Union, operate under what is
known as the civil law or Roman law system. That immediately produces
a typical instance of the cultural gap in international law.
In the same fashion, one would have to take stock of factors that
shape the law rather than being shaped by it. Fishing, though undertaken to produce food, is in its first stages a business activity,
which means money to many people in different ways. The question of
extended jurisdiction has a lot to do with war, which is a very primitive
way of doing business. I am referring to an activity known in the late
Middle Ages as privateering which was partially condoned by international
law, provided it was done beyond three miles off the coast. One of the
suspected origins of the three-mile rule is that as long as coastal
defenses could reach a ship within three miles, all nasty business
better be done beyond three miles. Sucb was business in those days.
Naturally each country always looks first upon its own interest, and it
might as well do so. Of course, the relative weight and might of each
country adds a special significance to that attitude. Therefore, the
conflict was not confined to the academic context in which we can discuss it today, but it took much more complicated forms. These factors
have influenced international law from its very origins and cannot be
ignored.
My co-panelists were generally happy that the United States is
considering expanding its fisheries jurisdiction. You might be surprised
to hear that, though speaking from an international viewpoint, I am also
very happy. Most other internationalists will probably wail about the
United States finally giving up hopes of developing international law
on this matter and joining the club of "sea grabbers". I am happy for
an entirely different reason. About.eight years ago I was tnvolved with
the 200-mile claim of a small nation known as Ecuador, which was in the
habit of seizing California tuna boats every January. The prevailing
view in the United States at the time was entirely different from everything you have heard here today. Unilateral claims were naughty. The
international law was a three-mile territorial sea and anyone making claims
beyond three miles was violating international law. If one could not have
uniform laws, the only way to solve the problem was through treaties. At
that time, I wrote an article entitled "The Ecuador Fisheries Dispute" in
which, much to the annoyance of some international scholars, I said that
"in protecting their own interests, the larger maritime states would find
it convenient to recognize the similar interests of smaller nations and
from a practical viewpoint this may well be a possible avenue to mutual
understanding". I am happy to see that some of the things which I predicted then are turning out to be true. Now, eight years later, we find
the United States making an almost 180-degree turn on this matter.' I do
not think the United States has betrayed its own ideals, but rather that
the circumstances intervening in those eight years have made the United
States aware of certain things of which other countries, like Ecuador,
had become aware twenty-four years earlier. The seething dispute of a
few years ago may disappear now that both countries are claiming the
same number of miles.
1

Lecouna, The Ecuador Fisheries Dispute (A New Approach to an Old Problem)
2 JMLC 91 (1970),
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Because of the cultural gap I cited before, I think the first order
of business should be to ensure that the terms which we use every day are
effective tools for thinking in common rather than the source of further
misunderstanding. The terms are deceptively uniform; they can be translated from English into any other language and yet will not have the
same meaning. If I am going to make a contribution to bridging that gap,
I think it is only appropriate that I try to make you, my American hosts,
aware of the inherent dangers of certain words.
Let me start with the term "sovereignty." If a country makes an
exclusive claim to fisheries within a part of the high seas, is that
claim tantamount to sovereignty or is it not? The Anglo-Saxon position
adopted not only by the United States, but also by the U.K., Canada,
Australia, and India, has been that this is not sovereignty. The U.S. has
always referred to a "contiguous fisheries zone", first established in
1964, with a breadth of nine miles added to the three-mile territorial
sea. Now the zone would be 197 miles wide, which is just the difference
between 200 miles and the three miles of territorial sea. However, the
International Court of Justic'e, in settling the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries
case in 1951, said that any claim of jurisdiction over a certain area of
the sea, of whatever extent or type, or any attempt to exercise that
jurisdiction is an exercise of sovereignty. Therefore, whether it is an
unqualified, generalized claim of sovereignty, or whether jurisdiction
is asserted just to regulate fishing, pollution, or any other activity,
sovereignty is being exercised. This is how most of the rest of the
world envisages these claims and that is why sometimes other countries
say they claim sovereignty oveL 200 miles. The American legal mind
reacts with shock, arguing that sovereignty applies only to the three
miles; over the remaining 197 miles it is just a fishing rights claim.
Another instance of certain words being fraught with inherent danger
is found in the theory of natural resources conservation. As Mr. Brewer
pointed out earlier, this theory started to become embedded in the body
of the law with President Truman's conservation proclamation in 1945. It
is amazing how topical his own words are today.

It :is worth remarking

that in 1945 the United States claimed the right to ,establish conservation
measures applicable to areas of the high seas well b1eyond its three-mile
territorial sea. At best, if there were legitimate :interests of other
foreign fishermen, the United States would take them into account. Not
surprisingly, this proclamation is one of the factors that led a number
of other countries to start pushing their claims farther out. If the
U.S. was doing it, why should not the others do likewise? Shortly thereafter, in 1949, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Coni1ention was signed.
Quite logically perhaps, the three Latin American countries with the
largest fisheries resources followed suit with the 1952 conference in
Santiago de Chile, attended by Chile, Peru, and Ecuador, where they
established a common conservation zone, which was as long as their combined littoral and 200 miles wide. That is how the 200 miles became one
of the new concepts of the dispute. I will return to the 200 miles figure
later on.
23

There is also the question of the physical amount of space being
claimed. Again the Anglo-Saxon system draws a distinction between the
seabed and the water above it. Traditionally, it has been the United
States' position that President Truman's 1945 proclamation over the
continental shelf was not tantamount to a claim on the water above the
shelf. And again that distinction was quite unintelligible and illogical
to many countries in the rest of the world. Based on the Roman principles
of property law, they accept the rather simplistic but very practical
notion that property rights do not affect just a flat piece of the crust
of the earth, but they go all the way below and all the way above that
piece of land, creating a sort of imaginary cone from the outer reaches
of the space to the center of the earth. How then could the United
States claim that it owned the seabed and at the same time argue that
it was not making any claim on the water above the seabed? There again
develops a controversy where some people will say the United States is
not sincere, is devious, or is trying to draw :Byzantine distinctions for
its own interest. In fact, the root of the dilennna lies with England's
straying away from Roman Law in the Middle _Ages.
Some funny things happen to the fish as well. With such distinguished company in this panel, I hope that if I incur some scientific
error, I may be excused on account of being a lawyer. Scientists classify
fish in two very large categories called necton and benthos; necton being
those which float between the surface and the bottom, and the benthos
those which normally rest_ on the bottom. For instance, the tuna fish swims
and so it is riecton, while the lobster and crab crawls and sits on the
bottom. Therefore, he. who cla:f.ms rights on the continental shelf would
have jurisdiction over the lobster and crab but not the tuna. Well, in
the article I wrote, I cited two international agreements where lobster
and crab are treated differently. There has been an agreem~nt between
the U.S. and Japan over Alaskan crab which were said to be benthos, and
they were ruled by the law of the seabed. And there has been an agreement
between France and Brazil where it was recognized that every now and then
lobster took short leaps and since they are not in contact with the bottom
they must swim and go by the law of the water above them. Obviously, all
this gets very confusing for people from different backgrounds.
You may have read lately of another development; so-called "nodules"
have been found on the seabed. These nodules are small accumulations of
manganese which contain other minerals as well. Now, the technology has
been found to scoop them up and exploit them connnercially. If these nodules
do not jump, do not swim, but sit on, rather than under, the surface of the
seabed, then this should make you wonder what legal regime should apply?
As I understand it, these minerals have been washed through the siltation
process by river waters out of the mineral deposits in the continent. Some
countries take the view that if manganese is leaking from their own mountains, it must be theirs, no matter how far in the sea it may be.
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Now I would like to tackle another one of the great bones of contention; namely, what should be the breadth of the tt~rritorial sea? I
have made some cynical remarks about the origins of the three-mile rule
but somehow this rule was variously accepted as long as it could be enforced. The history of Northern Europe is full of incidents between
Denmark and Russia and between Holland and Norway and between England
and everybody else. Granted, some of these countries were so close to
each other that there was not room for much more than three miles anyway. However, the consensus starts breaking down by the time of World
War I. I will have to skip a number of specific cas,~s, but when the
first Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea was convened in 1930, the
reporter of the conference proceedings stated that it was obvious that
there was no longer a consensus on what the breadth of the territorial
sea should be under international law. As you see, the argument did
not start yesterday, and it has been rather topical for the last 46
years. Beside President Truman's twin Proclamations of 1945, there is
another precedent for the 200-miles concept. During World War II, the
United States convinced the other countries of the Wt~stern Hemisphere
to create a so-called "neutrality zone" which was a modern-day version
of the Monroe Doctrine to keep the German U-boats out of continental
waters. At that time, the zone's limit was established 300 miles away
from the coasto This is how American nations started getting the notion
that the three miles did not make sense anymore for one reason or another.
In 1958, another Geneva Conference managed to go as far as recognizing as a principle the right of the coastal state to protect its
natural resources. However, wh~n the Conference attempted to define
how far that right should extend, it failed and there was no possible
way of mending that. I have had the honor of working at one time for a
distinguished American, Mr. Arthur Dean, who at that time served as the
U.S. representative at the Geneva Conference. He summed up ·.the American
position very candidly when he said: "The American position consists
in keeping the territorial seas as narrow as possiblE~, and the high seas
as broad as possible." From the viewpoint of a largE~ maritime power like
the United States, it could not make better sense. Of course, that
conflic.ted with everybody else's view. Of late, and this has become
evident in the third Conference on the Law of the Sea that started in
Caracas in 1974, a new trend has developed: if we cannot agree among
ourselves on the breadth of our national claims, instead of trying to
work things outward from the shoreline, why not define a core of international waters to be internationally managed as the common heritage of
mankind? To many people, this resembles one of thosE~ family reunions
with the lawyer, after Papa passed away, where all the heirs are sitting
and talking about how to divide up the estate. As in those reunions, it
is the poor members of the family who say "Nothing of the sort. Because
we know who is going to get the largest share." In my view, this is why
the Caracas Conference could not reach agreement, why agreement was not
reached in 1975, and why some people are making gloorny predictions about
the new effort that started about a week ago in New York. I am still
very optimistic however, because once people start perceiving things
through a common lens, they will find new ways to agree. It is, however,
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not until they sit next to each other and look through that same lens
that they will start having a relatively common perception which will
permit them to work towards something mutually acceptable.
Some.,people have been willing, in principle, to accept the notion
of an economic zone extending many miles from the coast but have argued
that 200 miles is exaggerated. Without trying to exhaust the subject,
I would like to draw your attention to two facts. If people could agree
to three miles, or even 12 miles, in the North Sea or in the Baltic Sea,
it is because they have to coexist in a rather narrow maritime space.
You could not possibly think of Denmark claiming 200 miles off its shores
and jumping over Sweden. However, if you would look at the map and
measure a claim of 200 miles off the west coast of South America, it is
proportionately smaller than 12 miles around the coast of England. Therefore, the "sea grabbing" argument has very little base. The second fact
is a modern development and that is the modern fishing fleet. This is-a
huge organization based on extremely advanced technology that can move
and operate away from its home port for several months. I am not just
talking about the traditional 'fishermen's journey like you read in the
Bible. These fleets can stay at sea longer than a U-boat could in the
Second World War. In the presence of that type of operation, 200 miles
is nothinge Again, the 200 miles have to be looked at in relation to
what modern technology permits today.
The nagging question remains, why 200 miles? What is so magic about
200 miles? Well, there is nothing magic about 200 miles. In the western
coast of South America there happens to be a cold water stream called the
Humboldt Current that runs northbound from the Antarctic. At about the
latitude of Ecuador, there is a warm water current called the "Corriente
del Nino" or the "Child's Stream". When the two streams co~ 'together
and blend, there is a chemo-physical reaction which makes the Humboldt
Current move towards the coast or away from the coast at different times
during the year. Now, the maximum distance the Humboldt Current was
found to move away from the coast was 200 miles. And it so happens that
the tuna always swim into the Humboldt Current. So if a country were
worrying about the tuna, it has to claim as far as the tuna or the Current
would go. Hence the origin of the 200 miles claim. There is no reason
why the rest of the world has now to claim 200, 188, 533 or any other
number of miles. It has to be recognized that the 200-miles claim stem
from the peculiar circumstances of three particular countries--Chile,
Peru and Ecuador--which were concerned with a problem of their own. And
this is why they always claimed they were doing nothing more than what the
International Court of Justice said each country has the right to do; to
fix its own zone based on the scientific and ecological realities of its
own environment. If any of you have any doubts about the importance of the
200-mile zone for those three South American countries, let me add a bit
of information. In 1968 the British weekly The Economist was discussing,
as it periodically does, England's little war with Iceland over cod. And,
although some statistics cited earlier today may contradict me, The Economist
remarked then that the total catch on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts
of the United States was only 4% of the total world catch; whereas fishing
off the coast of Peru, on the Pacific Ocean only and with a much shorter
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shoreline accounted for 15% of the world catch. Litt.le wonder then that
fishermen and governments got so overheated about th,~ 200-mile claims off
the Peruvian, Chilean, and Ecuadorian coasts. I do not have to get into
a big argument to demonstrate that people are getting hungrier by the day
all over the world. Even in this privileged nation food is at a premium.
As in many other instances in the history of mankind:, there will be disputes. Lawyers will be called upon to sustain or to make a case for their
countries and in this process they will be asked to justify 200, 300 or
whatever number of miles is needed to preserve the catch for their own
nations.
I have said before that I consider some current events felicitous.
And I would like to repeat this assessment in the face of some pious
wailing over the alleged collapse of the international law of the sea.
Presumably, this "collapse" occurs because each country is now acting
unilaterally instead of relying on treaties. I have always questioned
whether, in fact, international law was truly reflected by treaties, or
whether they are merely the only tangible evidence of international law.
I am using the word "law" in its highest and most commendable sense; law
as the embodiment of certain principles of justice, law as a set of rules
by which all of us would like to be governed, not just statutes, or mere
positive law. If any such law can be established internationally, are
the treaties the best vehicle? Let me just point a few counter arguments
to that. In the first place, since the Middle Ages there have been all
sorts of treaties recognizing fishing rights over more than three miles,
even though most nations were claiming three miles for sovereign purposes.
The treaty is primarily an ad hoc arrangement to be used for the purpose
of settling a specific problem at hand which concerns two or more parties
involved in the treaty. Consequently, it has become a rather frequent
practice to include in the treaties a disclaimer clause to the effect that
regardless of the treaty's provisions they are without prejudice to the
sovereign claims of the parties on the sea waters. :Many times after I
have finished reading one of those treaties, I draw the rather cynical
conclusion that it settled nothing except the particular problem of the
day.

Of course, this is not really the embodiment of international law

as so loftily defined earlier.
Another frequent source of treaties has been the: well~known fact
that people run out of annnunition or simply get bored. with shooting at
each other. Those treaties are no more than the legal consecration on a
document of what the peculiar state of the war was when the beligerants
held their fire. I hope we can all agree that is not a good method of
making law. Otherwise, international law would merely depend on how
much I can clobber you before we sit down and sign a treaty. However,
I can cite a number of treaties that are held to represent the international law of the sea simply because they contain maritime clauses, even
if these clauses were signed at gun point. Now, as everyone knows, that
is not valid law in the U.S. or anywhere else. Whether agreement is
reached with a knife at your throat or with a bomb on. your capital city
is only a difference of scale. Basically I would not consider such a
treaty a good source of international law. On the other hand, there are
a number of other treaties that are good sources of international law, and
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I think there are a number of dedicated lawyers, scholars, and government officials throughout the world who deserve praise for having
written or having strived to write good treaties, which are reflections
of accommodating and approximating positions from which good law will
emerge. What I would simply propose that everybody keep in mind is
whether all treaties make good law, or whether this proposition is
something to be taken with a grain of salt. I think this has a bearing
on why countries like Ecuador and other small nations have a general
attitude of mistrust towards treaties. Let me just give you two examples. In the North West Atlantic Fisheries Convention several large
fishing powers sat together and, as early as 1949, agreed on conservation measures, fishing stock management, etcetera. The same year,
the United States signed shrimp conventions with Mexico and Costa Rica
which went no further than stating that there was much to be studied
before agreeing on any conservation measures. It seems logical that
some small countries developed the notion that unless they had a fishing
fleet as powerful and as active as their counterpart, they really did
not stand to gain much out of a treaty but rather the contrary.
This attitude deserves a little bit more attention and perhaps a
broader scope of analysis. For instance!' what is the attitude with
which people approach these problems? Mr. Douglas has dwelt on this
point and I would like to add a couple of thoughts to his. We have
the coastal fishermen, typically the New England fishermen and the
Ecuadorian fishermen; but there are also the international fishermen ,
i.e., the Russian fishermen as seen by the New Englanders or, from the
viewpoint of the Ecuadorians, tpe California fishermen. As you can see,
within the United States, your own compatriots will have two approaches
depending on what kind of trade they are in. Now imagine when that
is multiplied on an international scale. I referred earlier to the
question of the means at one's disposal, the research that goes into
developing a fishery, the technology that goes into exploiting it
profitably, and the capital required to do it. Again, there is often
a dismal disparity between countries which has nothing to do with their
geographical location next to a valuable fishery. From this viewpoint,
the "sea grabbing" approach has been a peacetime reflection of the same
attitude one takes during war: let's grab as much as possible so that
by the time we sit down to negotiate we will bargain from a position
of strength. Of course, this depends very much on the means at one's
disposal to enforce one's claims and this has been demonstrated throughout history. When Iceland started claiming 12 miles, she got into
trouble with England who sent warships to waters Iceland claimed were
hers. Iceland sent patrol boats, cut British nets and Britons and
Icelanders shot at each other. That was until 1964, when England extended jurisdiction, excuse me, the "contiguous zone" to 12 miles
and British complaints against Iceland stopped. Pretty soon though
Iceland, again worried about overfishing, pushed the limit to 50 miles
and the whole affair was reenacted.
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In the case of Ecuador and the United States, the dispute took a
completely different tack. Although there was a great disparity in
naval power, the United States was not in the mood to send a naval
squadron all the way to Ecuador to escort the San Die~go tuna fleet.
On the other hand, Ecuador did not have enough boats to patrol their
200-mile zone. This led, instead, to some funny stories. Let me
just briefly refer to one where a fishing captain was seized and taken
to court where he said: "Your Honor, I was exercising my right of
innocent passage in the high seas and I cannot see the reason why I
am detained." When it was the State's turn, the prosecutor called
the captain of the patrol boat as a witness and he said: "Well,
Sir, what happens is that the Ecuadorian Navy has such slow boats
and poor training that it cannot check each trawler properly; instead,
we have developed a number of assumptions in order to determine whether
somebody is passing innocently or whether he is fishing. If we see a
boat that looks like a trawler and it has net and other fishing gear
out on the deck and a lot of birds flying behind, we assume the boat
is fishing and we seize it. , We do not have much time~ for inquiries."
So much for innocent passage.· You may by now have de~veloped a feeling
that a good deal of what I am saying is sprinkled with the usual Latin
flair for the colorful and the picaresque. So, I would like to quote an
Australian, Dr. R. D. Lumb, who should not be suspected of the same
penchant for the colorful. He said: "There are a multitude of conflicting interests involved between developed and developing nations,
between deep-sea fishing nations and those who rely on coastal fisheries,
between strategically advanced nations and those with only a primitive
form of naval capacity. The at_tainment of international solutions is
dependent on finding areas of agreement even at the stage of organizing
an agenda for a fishery or ocean bed conference." One wonders if he
did not have a crystal ball when he wrote in 1969: ' If the; problems
become really pressing, State inertia might be overcome and action may
be speeded up to resolve the questions by resorting to international
dialogue and, ultimately, reaching treaty commitments~"
11

I would like to add something else.

But, before~ I get into that

I would like to apologize if what I say seems to have a certain offending
ring. Because I feel a certain debt to the United States, I think it is
only fair that you now be warned of certain problems into which you may
run when this country extends jurisdiction to 200 miles. This is what
I call fishing with a calculated risk. In 1954, Ecua.dor, Chile and Peru
agreed on enforcement machinery and cooperation to implement their 1952
claim over the 200-mile zone. In 1968, the Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives wrote a report on what had
happened over those 14 years of conflict with those three nations. According to that Congressional report, it appears that in 14 years only 75 U.S.
vessels were seized. The total fines imposed during that period by
Columbia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Peru amounted to less
than $500,000. In addition, the apparent policy of the American Tunaboat
Association based in California was to pay the registration and license
fees only when it was necessary to secure the release of the seized boat.
Again on the basis of that report, in the 1961-1967 period, the average
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license fees paid every year amounted to $10,000 and these costs were
reimbursed to the fishing industry by the U.S. Government under the
1954 Fishermen Protective Act. Now, compare these costs of trespassing
with the return. According to the same report, the potential income of
a tuna. vessel ranges between $1,500 to $2,700 per day, so the median
average income of a tuna vessel would have been about $2,100 per day.
The 75 vessels which were seized over 14 years would have made, as a
whole, $160,000 per day. The seized vessels were detained on average,
for four to five days. As a result, the amount of fines paid over those
14 years represents the equivalent of about three days' income and the
license fees paid per year would represent the equivalent of about .06
days' income of those 75 boats. That is what I call the theory of the
calculated risk: even if you get caught, it may still pay off. I think
that the United States may now be confronted with the same attitude by
those fishing within the 200-mile American zoneo
One additional reason to feel optimistic about international
agreement is the remarkable closeness of the Ecuadorian arguments to
those being invoked here today. First of all, there is almost no
continental shelf on the Pacific Coast of South America, so Ecuador
cannot rely on the shelf claims to protect itR fisheriesn

Secondly~

the interactions between oceanic streams which I have mentioned before
produce this belt of 200 miles where nutrient substances are carried
towards the surface of the sea because of the different temperatures in
the water. The Ecuadorians say that the Humboldt Current creates an
ecosystem in the adjacent sea while, at the same time, it creates very
adverse geographical conditions.in the coasts of northern Chile, Peru,
and part of Ecuador, which are notably barren and deserted. Those who
have been there compare them to a lunar landscape. The Ecuadorians also
argue that one reason there are so many nutrients in the Humboldt Current
is that the rivers coming down the steep slopes of the Andes are washing
those nutrients into the Pacific Ocean because current climate conditions
do not permit the land to retain them. In effect, they say, out of
our mountains comes the food that feeds the fish that somebody else is
catching from our waters. So, if we actually feed those fish, they are
legitimately ourso Sounds similar to the theory of the salmon spawning
grounds, does it not? At the same time, Ecuador claims it is relying
on Mr. Truman's doctrines; and if he said it was all right to do it,
then we are just doing the same. But, they are prompt to add, the
Ecuadorian claims do not in any way prevent the exercise of rights
granted to other nations under international law, inasmuch as such
claims allow navigation and flight over the ocean, submarine exploration,
scientific investigation and fishing operations subject naturally to
corresponding regulations9 In other words, since 1952 Ecuador has
been repeating that claiming 200 miles for exclusive fishing rights is
not a violation of international lawo
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In the end, you may wonder if my whole purpose in speaking was
merely to demolish laboriously arrived at concepts. Was I simply
trying to be facetious, to be funny, or to make fun of what other
people regard seriously? Well, I have heard too much heated argument; I have seen too many countries retaliating against each other
where it hurts the most, even in areas totally unrelated to fisheries.
I have seen much tension and much harm done, all unde1~ a self-righteous
banner of patriotism on the part of whoever is doing ,ghatever he is
doing to whomever he is doing it. I decided eight years ago, and
still hold that view, to adopt a rather light and opt:lmistic attitude,
since no one is absolutely wrong. In the words of om~ of my country's
poets: "I've never seen a farmer putting grain outside his bag."
Everybody has to work for his country and that is his duty as a government official, as a diplomat, and as a law-abiding citizen. If everybody starts with the notion that everyone else around a negotiating
table is doing his own duty as best he can, I think the tone of the
debate will be calmer. Trading accusations and blaming each other for
all sorts of naughty things will not take us anywhere. More than conflict, what faces us is a great deal of misunderstand:lng. After reflecting for some time, I have arrived at a few conclusions which I
would like to share with you. Number one, international law as it
concerns territorial waters and fisheries in particular has not evolved
from rules of reason or from legal principles as much as it has from a
struggle between national interests where big and small nations alike
pursue similar goals with the different means at their disposal. In
the second place, the positions adopted by several nations vary according
to strategic and economic considerations and their relative maritime
and naval power. Thirdly, the width of the territorial sea, fishing
zone or whatever other name you give to it, is unquestionably an unsettled matter in international law. No legitimate claim can be made
that international law prescribes any number of miles. Fourth, everybody has come to recognize that the coastal states have undisputed rights
over the fisheries in the adjacent sea; but whether there is an international consensus as to the breadth of the area subject to such rights is
still an open question.

I would invite all of us to look at the historic record of past
disputes and I submit that such a record offers a reasonable prospect of
future acconnnodation between the parties once the large and the small
countries begin to recognize the legitimate interests of the other.
As far as we in this room are concerned, we will undoubtedly be called
upon to advocate the righteousness of our own country'·s cause, either
as lawyers, government officials or scientists. In the absence of a
higher international institution, widely accepted to adjudicate the
issues, we ought not to for get that every one of thos,~ issues will always
have more than one side to be looked at. I trust I am justified in concluding with an optimistic and hopeful note. Thank you very mucho
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AN ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED EXTENDED JURISDICTION LEGISLATION!
by
Ivar Strand
Virginia Institute of Marine Science
The international acceptance of exclusive zone management, as
expressed in the proposed extension of the U.S. fisheries zone, will
inevitably create economic impacts throughout the fi.shing industry,
the nation, and the world. This institutional change will fundamentally alter the customs of seafood production and result in new economic patterns, Incentives to produce, market channels and the composition of production are among the elements which will shift in response
to extended jurisdiction. ,Although the changes will first appear only
in the seafood industry, other industries will feel secondary impacts
as they compete with fisheries products, provide capital to fishing
firms or interact in a variety of ways. The entire international
product flow will vary in the long run, and countries with small
exclusive zones and substantial distant water fleets, such as Japan,
will rely increasingly on other methods to provide their protein
requirements.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate possible economic outcomes of the proposed extended jurisdiction (EJ) legislation and
evaluate its economic merits. Two basic concepts, efficiency and income
distribution, are employed as criteria to judge the merits of the legislation. Using the efficiency criterion, the first section contains a
comparison of t~e exclusive zone approach (inherent in extended jurisdiction) with the current situation and management by a species approach

(international agreements on individual species). These three alternatives are then examined in the second section with regard to their effects
on the national and international distribution of income. In the concluding section, the author ventures the argument that.adoption of the
exclusive zone is a rational economic choice for the United States.
Before proceeding to the discussion, efficiency and distribution
must be clearly defined. Distribution simply describes who receives
income generated by production. An analysis of institutional change will
generally suggest groups that are likely to benefit or suffer as a result
of the change. Efficiency analysis asks whether production and distribution can be changed so as to monetarily benefit someone without monetarily
injuring any other individual. An institutional arrangement is judged
!support of this work came from the National Sea Grant Program Contract
No. 04-6-158-44047. I wish to thank the National Oceani.c and Atmospheric
Administration for providing much of the information contained in this paper.
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efficient if it generates production and distribution which cannot
be reorganized to aid someone without injuring anyone else. The
practical criteria employed for efficiency is whether consumers value
the last unit produced as much as the last unit costs to produce. For
the fishery, the question is whether consumers value the last ton of
fish caught as much as it costs to catch, in terms of actual production
costs and, most importantly, the effect on future stocks.
EFFICIENCY
Current Situation
Domestic fish stocks beyond the 12-mile contiguous zone can be
classified as unmanaged or open-access resources. These coastal resources are the property of no one and management becomes at most a
volunteer effort. During some portion of their life cycle, the majority
of fish inhabit areas where vessels can operate free of regulation.
Within this economic climate, fishermen perceive their costs only in
terms of operating expenses, aisregarding the future costs that current
landings imply. This is completely rational, for if one fisherman considers future effects there is no guarantee that other fishermen will do

likewise. Even in the unlikely event that fishermen could reach consensus
to decrease current landings, there are still enforcement problems and
lack of legal barriers to prevent new entrants. Excess capacity, depleted
fish stocks, and inefficient production are evident in the current situation.
The numerous cases of depleted fish stocks (National Marine Fisheries
Service 1975:76) are examples of current inefficiencies and overcapitalization.
It has also been estimated that Pacific salmon landings could be achieved
with $50 million less effort (Crutchfield and Pontecorvo 1969:174) and
North Atlantic cod with $50 to $100 million less effort (Ch~isty 1973:17).
There are few, if any, highly priced species that are not overexploited.
As an aside, it is noted that other serious institutional barriers
exist which preclude efficier.t domestic seafood production. The U.S. Code
(Title 46 §251 (a)), presumably in an attempt to preserve national shipbuilding capabilities, states that "no foreign-flag vessel shall, .•• , land
in a port of the United States its catch of fish taken on board such vessels
on the high seas or fish processed therefrom ••• " As a result, domestic
fishermen must buy U.S. built vessels and pay approximately 30% more, competing at a significant disadvantage. This law also effectively prohibits
the growth of domestic processing and distribution facilities. Foreign
vessels out-compete domestic vessels and land much of our coastal production
(e.g. 88% of East Coast haddock). This raw product cannot be landed until
routed through a foreign port, unnecessarily raising the price of domestic
raw product and limiting the growth of domestic processing facilities. One
must question whether the shipbuilding industry is aided (there are fewer
U.S. vessels given the competitive disadvantage) and, more importantly,
whether the benefits of the law outweigh its costs. There are also similar
inefficiencies in the tariff structure which must eventually be addressed.
34

Species Approach
International dispute settlement is the primary obstacle to efficient production under a species approach. Although the responsibility
for fishery management decisions rests with the coastal state, appeals
on the decisions are referred to the World Court. Costly negotiations,
determination of allocations, and continuing administration of appeals
are a burdensome expense.
Secondly, the World Court recognizes the full utilization concept
as an accepted practice using the species approach and could force U.S.
into use of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of a single species as its
sole objective. For any species that is not harvested at MSY, the custom
is for coastal states to avail the difference between MSY and the harvest to non-coastal states. This could force the U.S. into a single
management objective, maximum sustainable yield, at a sacrifice of
economic returns. A study of the New England yellow-tail flounder
industry (Gates and Norton 1974:13) demonstrated that an additonal
$5 millon in national income could be generated by regulating to achieve
economic efficiency instead of MSY. That is, some of the capital and
manpower that would be needed to catch MSY could be r·edirected into other
activities that returned a higher dollar value ($5 millon in the yellowtail case) to the nation.
Other costly inefficiencies arise from decisions based solely on
full utilization of each species rather than a multi-species approach.
Two examples, George's Bank haddock and California anchovy, illustrate
this point. Despite the depleted status of George's :Bank haddock stocks,
a decision to fully utilize cod on George's Bank would imply that haddock
stocks would never be restored. Incidental catch of haddock by vessels
seeking cod prohibit sufficient restraint on the haddock stocks. The
economically efficient solution might be to restore haddock stocks at
the expense of current cod landings. Similarly, decisions based on full
utilization of California anchovy would mean significant decreases in
sport fish which forage on anchovy.

Under the present concept of species

management, there is no consideration of multi-species problems.
Exclusive Zone Approach
Sole ownership (Scott 1955) is the most commendable aspect of
exclusive zone management from an efficiency standard. Responsibility
for the determination and allocation of allowable effort, enforcement of
rules and the appellate procedures rests entirely with the coastal state.
Although it is possible to abuse this authority, an e:Eficient use of the
resources in the exclusive zone is also a possibility.
Coastal states cannot ignore the future costs cr1~ated by current
uses of fish stocks because these costs will be borne by them. The
costs of depleted stocks are internal to the coastal state and prudent

decision making will consider them.
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Further, except for Constitutional considerations, there are no
customs inherent in exclusive zone management that could restrict
goals to narrowly defined objectives like MSY. Problems of multispecies management could conceivably be addressed by the coastal state.
Administration and enforcement costs should also be minimized
by adoption of the exclusive zone approach. The costly administration
of dispute settlement should be significantly reduced because decisions
need not be reviewed in an international forum. Enforcement costs,
especially those incurred when allocations are exceeded, may fall
substantially. Furthermore, there is nothing to preclude consideration
of enforcement cost in the determination of methods .and .goals of. :ma~gement.
An outstanding example of this form of management is the
International Fur Seal Convention of 1911. Except for the poor
publicity regarding the method of capture, the treaty has been judged
to be very successful (Christy and Scott 1969) and even Wesley Marx
in The Frail Sea stated "No other marine creature has been placed
under such rewarding management." The U.S. and the Soviets simply
share the exclusive zone and.proceeds from the catch.
To an economist concerned about efficient use of marine resources,
there is optimism about the exclusive zone concept--at least there is

a possibility for rationality to prevail.
DISTRIBUTION
National Considerations
The enactment of exclusive zone management will provide windfalls
to some individuals and may cause hardships to others. This section
presents an analysis of those changes with emphasis on overall national
gains and the regional aspects of the gains. To examine these issues,
reference to a document prepared by the National Marine Fisheries
Service from eight studies conducted for the federal government is
frequently drawn. Due to the great uncertainties underlying the
entire analysis, I would be remiss if I did not state that the values

shown have wide variance.
To examine overall gains, it is useful to classify domestic
landings according to species habitat: Coastal Domestic, Anadromous,
Oceanic Distant Water and Coastal Distant Water. Coastal domestic
species inhabit the region within 200 miles of U.S. coast (cod),
anadromous species are spawned in domestic waters and outside 200 miles
offthe U.S. coast (salmon), oceanic distant water species migrate outside 200-mile zones (tuna), and coastal distant water species inhabit
areas within 200 miles of other countries (shrimp). Within these
classifications it is possible to see how the three institutions
(Open Acces~, Specie~ Approach, Exclusive Zone) might affect our
animal national· income (table 1) by the year 1982.
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TABLE 1

POTENTIAL NATIONAL GAINS OR LOSSESJV
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

Current
Situation

Species
Approach

Exclusive
Zone

0

52.5

890.5

-(35 to 50)

-(35 to 50)

-(35 to 50)

Oceanic Distant
(Tuna)

-37.5

-37.5

-37.5

Coastal Distant
(Shrimp/Lobster

-22.2

-14.8

-22.2

Coastal
Anadromous

1/

Taken from Summary of The Impact of The Species Approach and
Exclusive Zone Upon Major U.S. Fisheries. Pg. 5.
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TABLE 2

POTENTIAL VALUE OF COASTAL R¥S9YRCES
UNDER DIFFERENT REGIMES-~-

w

00

Exclusive Zone

REGION

1972

Species Approach

Surplus

North East &
Middle Atlantic

116

141.0

285

169

South Atlantic
& Gulf

230

253

445

215

Pacific
Coast

47

52

513

466

Total

393

445

1,243

840

l/ Excludes menhaden, oysters, clams, and some crabso
2/ Excerpts from Summary of The Impact of The Species Approach and Exclusive
Zone Upon Major U.S. Fisheries.

Pg. 11.

First, consider landings classified as coming from domestic coastal
species. Here, value of landings are estimated to remain stable under
the current regime; reductions in landings from overfishing are offset
by discovery of new resources. My personal feeling is that this is an
optimistic estimate. With the species approach, there is reason to
believe that management will improve landings so that value of landings
will rise by $52.2 million per year by 1982. However, the exclusive
zone management through phase-out of foreign fleets will gain an
additional $890.5 million annually. It is clear that national gains
from coastal species are greatest under exclusive zone management.
The surprising fact is that the gains from exclusive zone
management are equally distributed regionally (Table 2). Northeast
and Middle Atlantic fishermen, the most pro-EJ group, may increase
their landings under EJ by about $150 million. However, the South
Atlantic Gulf region can gain in the order of $200 million and the
Pacific coast about $450 million. The gains in the Northeast would
come from hake, cod, flounder, mackerel, herring, and squid, in the
South Atlantic from coastal pelagics, croaker, and spot, and on the
Pacific coast from pollack, liake, anchovy, and ocean perch.
The anadromous stocks are likely to suffer substantial losses
within any of these institutional arrangements (Tabl,e 1). The most
important anadromous stocks are the Pacific coast salmon, which migrate
far outside the 200-mile zone. Japanese or Soviet fleets can easily gain
access to them now or in the future. Although there is an argument
that Japanese fleets will be more prone to use fleets excluded from
200-mile zone for anadromous species, there is also reason to believe
that these fleets will eventually seek anadromous stocks anyway. The
exclusive zone might be advantageous from the standpoint that U.S.
pollack stock under the extended zone could be traded to Japan for
assurances against landings of salmon. Obviously th,e Pacific Northwest
will be hurt the most by foreign landings of anadromous species.
All economically important oceanic distant water species are
tuna.

Because of the great range these species inhabit, it is unlikely

that management can result without international agr1~ement. The loss
of $37.2 million (Table 1) is an estimate based on the premise that an
international agreement will be reached and the U.S. will reduce tuna
landings by about 1/3 regardless of our domestic reg:ime. This is an
extremely speculative estimate and is offered mostly for disc~ssion.
The final category is coastal distant water species such as shrimp
and lobster. U.S~ fleets are currently operating in British Guianas
and Brazil under a zonal approach, and it is likely that major changes
wi.11 occ:u,:- here~ The Mexican situation is in flux and there is likelihood we would lose six to seven percent of total U.S. landings; this
would occur in the Brownsville area causing a $22 million loss.
Potential national gains under EJ from the harv1~sting sector alone,
even under most dismal assumpt:i.ons, should be in the order of $200 million.
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International Effects
Let me briefly touch on one major international consideration, the
phase-out of countries with large distant water fleets. It is estimated
that the Soviet Union has 37% of its protein diet supplied by seafood
products, and the majority of those landings come from outside 200miles off its coast. As these large fleets are forced from coastal
states'exclusive zones, there must be severe repercussions within
countries such as Japan and the Soviet Union.
One outcome of the phase-out will probably be foreign investment
in coastal states, essentially a rush to get within the protected
zone. This has happened already on the West Coast as Japanese firms
have invested in many Alaskan processing facilities. Our distant
coastal water fleets (shrimp) have also invested in Central America.
It will heighten in the near future and undoubtedly bring outcries
from domestic fishermen to place restrictions on foreign investment.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, i t is safe to say that extended jurisdiction

offers the opportunity for potential economic improvement in domestic
fisheries. However, this will only become a reality if an active,
thoughtful management regime emerges from the legislation.
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